Alabama Workers' Comp Blawg

  • 07
  • Sep
  • 2026

Alabama Supreme Court Reinforces Workers’ Comp Exclusivity

 

The Exclusivity Doctrine is alive and well in Alabama that to the Alabama Supreme Court’s opinion in Duke v. Walmart, Inc., 2026 WL 785243 (Ala. Mar. 20, 2026), wherein it affirmed summary judgment in favor of Walmart and its employee, Qeon Gray, after an employee attempted to pursue tort claims arising from an accident for which he had already received workers’ compensation benefits.

 

Phillip Duke was employed by Walmart and was struck by a Walmart tractor-trailer driven by co-employee Qeon Gray in the parking lot of Walmart's distribution center. Duke claimed that he was “off duty” and jogging in the parking lot when the accident occurred.

 

Duke received workers’ compensation benefits, including medical and temporary-total-disability benefits. He nevertheless filed a civil lawsuit against Walmart and Gray asserting negligence, wantonness, negligent hiring and supervision, and other tort theories.

 

Walmart moved for summary judgment based on the exclusive-remedy provisions of Alabama's Workers’ Compensation Act, Ala. Code §§ 25-5-52 and 25-5-53. The trial court granted summary judgment, and Duke appealed.

 

On appeal, Duke argued that workers’ compensation exclusivity did not apply because he was off duty and was not performing work for Walmart when he was injured. The Supreme Court rejected that argument because, regardless of whether Duke was technically “off duty,” he had accepted workers’ compensation benefits for the injury.

 

The Court explained that Alabama law has consistently held that acceptance of workers’ compensation payments constitutes an election that prevents an employee from pursuing another remedy for the same injury. In short, an employee cannot accept workers’ compensation benefits and then attempt to characterize the same injury as outside the Workers’ Compensation Act in order to pursue tort damages against the employer.

 

The Court also noted that Walmart established through its records that Duke had received medical, temporary-total-disability, and other workers’ compensation benefits. That shifted the burden to Duke, who failed to present substantial evidence demonstrating that the Act did not apply.

 

The Court separately addressed Duke's claims against Gray.

 

Under Ala. Code § 25-5-11, an employee may pursue a claim against a co-employee in certain circumstances involving willful conduct. The statute imposes a significantly higher standard than ordinary negligence.

 

The Court found no evidence that Gray intended to injure Duke or that a reasonable person in Gray's position would have known that injury was substantially certain to result from his conduct. Although Duke alleged that Gray may have been under the influence of illegal drugs, he failed to present substantial evidence supporting his claim of willful conduct at the summary-judgment stage. As a result, the Supreme Court affirmed.

 

About the Author:

 

This article was prepared by Mike Fish, an attorney with Fish Nelson & Holden, LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing self-insured employers, insurance carriers and funds, and third-party administrators in all matters related to workers’ compensation. Fish Nelson & Holden is a member of the National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network. If you have any questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation in general, please contact Fish by e-mailing him at mfish@fishnelson.com or by calling him directly at 205-332-1448.

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